Illinois Distinguished Lecture Series in Operations Research
|Speaker||Professor Asu Ozdaglar|
|Event Contact:||Rachel McCool
Industrial and Enterprise Engineering
In many social and economic settings, decisions of individuals are affected by the actions of their friends, colleagues, and peers. Examples include adoption of new products and innovations, opinion formation and social learning, public good provision, financial exchanges and international trade. Network games have emerged as a powerful framework to study these settings with particular focus on how the underlying patterns of interactions, governed by a network, affect the economic outcomes. For tractability reasons, much of the work in this area studied games with special structure (e.g., quadratic cost functions, scalar non-negative strategies) or special properties (e.g., games of strategic complements or substitutes). These works relied on disparate techniques for their analysis which then led to different focal network properties for existence and uniqueness of equilibria.
In this talk, we will present a unified framework based on a variational inequality reformulation of the Nash equilibrium to study equilibrium properties of network games including existence and uniqueness, convergence of the best response dynamics and comparative statics. Our framework extends the literature in multiple dimensions. It applies to games with strategic complements, substitutes as well as games with general strategic interactions. It provides a systematic understanding of which spectral properties of the network are relevant in establishing fundamental properties of the equilibrium. Moreover, it covers network games with multidimensional and constrained strategy sets.
This is joint work with Francesca Parise.
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